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Abstract
Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the “volatility paradox” (Brunnermeier and San-
nikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged
periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always
call for more stringent regulation? We examine this question using a simple portfolio choice
model that features the interaction between learning and externality. We evaluate the po-
tential of a macroprudential policy in the form of a capital income tax to restore efficiency,
and highlight a key challenge faced by regulators: whether the stringency of prudential pol-
icy should rise or fall over time depends on the resilience of the financial system, which is
difficult to know and thus may lead to inefficient regulation. Our paper provides a simple
framework to shed light on the current regulation debates, such as the ongoing debates on
the financial deregulation initiatives in the U.S. (as evident in the August 2017 Jackson
Hole meeting), and the discussions on how to regulate the rapidly-developing online finance
industry in China.
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I Introduction
A view associated with Minsky (1992) holds that prolonged periods of economic growth
and financial stability lead investors to become overconfident about the prospects for future
growth and stability. Overconfidence leads to the build-up of risks in the financial system
as investors increase their leverage and invest in riskier portfolios. This build-up of risk sets
the stage for a financial crisis. This view is confirmed by the “volatility paradox” proposed
by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), a phenomenon where low-risk environments are con-
ducive to higher equilibrium leverage and greater buildup of systemic risk.1 Consistent with
this view, recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged
periods of financial stability during which credit supply expands and asset prices rise (Borio,
2012; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012, Drehmann et al., 2012; Danielsson et al., 2016).2 3
How should this phenomenon be accounted for in the design of macroprudential policies, if
at all? And does financial tranquility always call for more stringent regulation? At a point
in time, macroprudential policies to constrain investor risk-taking are justified if investors
fail to inernalize the effect of their portfolio choices on the probability of a systemic crisis.
However, both investors and policymakers face uncertainty about the size of that externality;
that is, about the extent to which investors’ risky portfolio choices may raise the likelihood
of a crisis. A long period of financial tranquility may induce investors to take more risk
(risk-taking effect, or input effect, as in Figure 1), but it also provides evidence that the
transmission mechanism between investor risk-taking and systemic crisis may not be as
strong as previously believed (resilience effect, or transmission effect). From the perspective
of a macroprudential regulator, it is therefore unclear a priori whether macroprudential
policies should be made more or less stringent over a period of prolonged financial tranquility.
The answer depends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects just described: the increase
in investor risk-taking and the improvement in the regulator’s perception of the resilience of
the financial system.
In this paper, we formalize this intuition using a simple model of portfolio choice and Bayesian
learning. In the model, investors have access to a safe asset and to a risky asset that, in
addition to its conventional risk properties, may expose the financial sector to the risk of a
systemic crisis. The investors do not know the extent to which the risky asset exposes the
financial sector to this systemic crisis risk, but they can learn about it from the financial
system’s history of performance. A long history of financial tranquility (i.e., the absence of
a crisis) builds up investors’ confidence and leads them to take larger positions in the risky
asset. However, a larger aggregate risky asset position raises the probability of a systemic
1 One difference between our model and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)’s is that the former focuses on
the role of learning in a simple portfolio model, whereas the latter highlights the role of liquidity in a full
macroeconomic model.
2 Recessions associated with systemic financial crises tend to be particularly deep and long-lasting. Laeven
and Valencia (2010) document that the median output loss of the recent financial crisis is 25 percent.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) observe that in financial crises the unemployment rate increases by 7 percentage
points and remains high for over four years on average.
3 In reference to China’s recent large credit booms, the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (April 2017)
also warns that the longer booms last and the larger credit grows, the more dangerous they become.
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crisis in the event that the investors’ confidence is mistaken.
Note that the learning process in our model is subject to a “complacency trap” in the
following senses. First, the investors will become more confident and invest more in the
risky asset as long as the crisis did not occur in the previous period. That is, the investors
will revise down their confidence only after the crisis has actually hit (“Cry only when death
is staring one in the face”). Second, the investors have a short memory about the crisis
and will revise down their confidence in only one period, which is the first period right after
the crisis; from the second post-crisis period on, as long as there is no crisis in the previous
period, the investors will again become more confident and invest more in the same risky
asset that has only recently led to the crisis (“Once on shore, pray no more”). Despite
the simplicity of our model, these features are consistent with recent evidence that financial
markets are rapidly increasing the investments in some credit products widely blamed for
exacerbating the recent global financial crisis.4
Within this simple framework, we first study the relationship between investors’ learning
process and the degree of financial market inefficiency. The laissez-faire equilibrium is ineffi-
cient because each trader imposes a negative externality through the effect of his risky asset
position on the systemic crisis probability. The equilibrium is characterized by excessive
risk-taking and excessive financial instability; at a point in time, equilibrium risky asset po-
sitions exceed the positions chosen by a constrained benevolent planner who must also learn
about the true systemic crisis probability. In our first main result, we derive the (necessary
and sufficient) condition on the crisis probabilities under which rising investor confidence
strengthens the negative externality, thereby aggravating the excessive risk-taking problem
and increasing the inefficiency of the laissez-faire equilibrium.
We then turn to the question of prudential policy. We show that, at a point in time, a
macroprudential regulator can reestablish efficiency by means of a capital income tax set at
an appropriate level.5 Our second main result is that, under the same condition derived in
the first result, the optimal tax rate rises as the degree of investor confidence (and, hence,
the degree of market inefficiency) rises.
The necessary and sufficient condition we derive captures precisely the intuition outlined
earlier. As a period of tranquility persists, the constrained planner becomes more confident
4 For example, Financial Times reported on August 23, 2017 that: “Hedge funds are embracing an esoteric
credit product widely blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis a decade ago, as low volatility and near
record prices for corporate debt tempt them into riskier areas to seek higher returns. The market for
’bespoke tranches’ - bundles of credit default swaps that are tied to the risk of corporate defaults - has
more than doubled in the first seven months of 2017.” In a speech at Jackson Hole in late August 2017, the
Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen also warned that memories of the last crisis “may be fading.” (Financial
Times, August 25, 2017).
5 This is a form of Pigouvian taxation, and is similar to the systemic risk taxation proposed by Acharya et
al. (2009). For convenience, the capital income tax in our paper is levied based on the gross investment
income rather than net investment income (i.e., investment return), as in the standard capital income tax.
Our derivations show that our results apply if we switch to the standard definition instead. For discussions
of the benefits and costs associated with the capital income tax (under the standard definition), see Gordon
et al. (2004) and the references therein. Our results also apply if we use financial transaction tax instead.
For discussions of the financial transaction tax, see Adam et al. (2015).
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in the fundamental stability of the financial system and comes to believe that the transmission
channel from investor risk-taking to systemic crisis is weaker. This reduces the severity of the
externality in the eyes of the planner, and leads the planner to increase its risky asset position
relative to the investors’ laissez-faire risky asset position (“resilience effect,” or “transmission
effect”). At the same time, however, a higher risky asset position increases the severity of
the externality directly, leading the planner to rein in risky asset investment relative to
that of the private investors under laissez-faire (“risk-taking effect,” or “input effect”). The
overall effect of rising confidence on the degree of market inefficiency (and hence on the
optimal stringency of macroprudential policy) depends on the relative sizes of these two
countervailing effects. The condition derived in our paper captures this comparison. We
deliberately keep our model very simple in order to focus on this point, which is obscured in
other papers that feature more complex financial market models.
These arguments highlight a key challenge faced by macroprudential regulators: the optimal
policy depends on the resilience of the financial system, but it is difficult to know the true
resilience. This opens the door to “inefficient deregulation” or “inefficient regulation”. On the
one hand, a regulator that overestimates the resilience of the system will tend to reduce the
stringency of macroprudential regulation as financial tranquillity persists, and this will induce
a build-up of financial risk that the regulator would not tolerate if it knew the system’s true
resilience. Some commentators and policymakers (such as Alan Greenspan) have argued that
this occurred in the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.6 On the other hand, a regulator
that underestimates the resilience of the financial system may repress financial activities
needlessly. This could prevent the uptake of financial innovations that might really be
effective at delivering value to investors (e.g. by diversifying risk more effectively). Thus,
the regulatory challenge is especially stark for innovative financial industries.7
In the remainder of this introduction, we discuss the related literature and situate our work
within it. After that, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines
the model, characterizes the competitive equilibrium and the social planner’s solution, and
presents our first main result. Section 3 characterizes the optimal capital income tax and
presents our second main result. Section 4 discusses the possibility of inefficient regulation
and further comparative statics. Section 5 presents some parametric examples. Section 6
further examines the dynamics of learning, and extends our model to the case where the
6 For example, Samuelson (2013) argues that “Many of the institutions that came to grief — banks, invest-
ment banks — were regulated. But regulators shared the optimistic consensus concerning the economy’s
transformation. Complacency made regulation permissive. It was the Great Moderation that gave us the
financial crisis and Great Recession.” The famous admission of Greenspan (2008) that he had “made a
mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks, is such that they were best
capable of protecting shareholders and equity in the firms” was an ex post acknowledgement that regulators
had overestimated the resilence of the financial system in the run-up to the crisis.
7 An example of such an industry is the rapidly growing online finance industry in China. As reported by
the Financial Times on March 20, 2017, China’s digital payments market has exploded to about 50 times
the size of that in the United States. And an offshoot of Alibaba has harnessed some of these online flows
to build Yu’e Bao into one of the world’s biggest money market funds. During such a rapidly-booming
period for an innovative industry like this, should the government loosen the regulation to further support
its development, or should the government tighten the regulation to contain the future risk? Our model
provides a framework for thinking about this pressing question.
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true state follows a Markov process. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature Our paper is related to four strands of literature. The first is the
literature on countercyclical macroprudential regulation. It has been widely believed that
desirable macroprudential policies should be countercyclical: during economic booms, the
financial sector is lenient in monitoring borrowers (Saurina and Jimenez, 2006) or is plagued
by overborrowing (Bianchi, 2011), so more stringent macroprudential policies should be
employed to build up buffers and curb excessive borrowing; during economic busts, more
loose macroprudential policies should be employed to help financial institutions absorb losses.
Such more stringent macroprudential policies can be higher capital requirements (Gordy
and Howells, 2006; Gordy, 2009; Drehmann et al., 2010; Bank for International Settlements,
2010; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010a, 2010b), higher provisioning (Packer
and Zhu, 2012; Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero, 2012; Jiménez et al., 2017), higher
borrowing cost (Bianchi, 2011), capital inflow taxation (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010), or lower
caps on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios (Wong et al., 2011; Krznar and Morsink,
2014). Our paper emphasizes that the optimal cyclical adjustment of macroprudential policy
— that is, whether it should become more or less stringent as a period of financial tranquility
persists — is a priori unclear under uncertainty about the resilience of the financial system.
Second, it is related to the literature on learning. One part of this literature focuses on learn-
ing about an individual manager or firm and examines the issue of manager compensation in
the finance industry.8 Another, more relevant part of the literature focuses on learning about
aggregate parameters of the financial industry. Biais et al. (2015) consider the dynamics
of an innovative sector in which agents learn about the sector’s exposure to negative shocks
and managers’ risk management efforts are subject to a moral hazard problem. They show
that rising confidence leads to lower risk-abatement effort by managers. Boz and Mendoza
(2014) construct a model with a collateral constraint, in which financial innovation acts as
a structural change that introduces a regime with a higher leverage limit. In the model,
learning about the risk of a new financial environment predicts large increases in household
debt. Bianchi et al. (2012) construct a macroeconomic model in which agents learn about
the transition probabilities between states with tight and loose borrowing constraints. In
this framework, they examine how the effectiveness of macroprudential policy depends on
the information available to the planner.
Perhaps the paper most similar to ours is Bhattacharya et al. (2015). In their framework, the
economy switches between two aggregate states — “good” and “bad” — and asset returns in
a period depend on the realization of the state. Investors do not know the true probability
that the good state will be realized in the next period, but they know that it takes one of
two possible values and they use the history of asset returns to update their beliefs about
it. Investors have access to two assets, one of which is riskier than the other (i.e. has a
larger return variance) under any probability distribution. They finance their investment
using their net worth and by issuing debt in the credit market. The authors use a three-
period version of the model to study the implications of learning for investors’ leverage and
8 Examples include Diamond (1991), Berk and Green (2004), Noe and Rebello (2012), Axelson and Bond
(2015), Celerier and Vallee (2015), and Bolton et al. (2016).
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risk-taking behavior.
While the modelling approach of Bhattacharya et al. (2015) bears many similarities to ours,
there are important differences that reflect different research priorities. Their interest in the
interaction between portfolio risk and the leverage cycle leads them to include debt finance
and micro-founded credit market transactions in their model. Moreover, the complexity of
their framework makes their welfare analysis rather opaque; they propose macroprudential
policies that they show to be welfare-enhancing using simulations, but they cannot provide
much intuition for those results. In contrast, we focus specifically on the implications of
learning, over many periods, for the degree of excessive risk-taking (and hence on the opti-
mal stringency of macroprudential regulation). Our simpler framework allows us to obtain
analytical characterizations of our welfare results and to highlight the countervailing effects
of rising investor risk-taking and increasing regulator confidence in the stability of the fi-
nancial system over periods of financial tranquility. As a side note, our model does not rely
on leverage to generate the crisis; instead, the crisis is generated through the misallocation
of resources (e.g., human capitals) among the real (conventional) and financial (innovative)
sectors.
Third, our paper is related to the literature on inefficient risk-taking arising from external-
ities in financial markets. Using a model of collateralized international borrowing, Jeanne
and Korinek (2010) considers a negative externality that arises as declining collateral val-
ues, tightening financial constraints and falling consumption mutually reinforce each other.
Bianchi (2011) identifies a systemic credit externality, which arises because private agents
fail to internalize the financial amplification effects of carrying a large amount of debt when
credit constraints bind. Focusing on economies with nominal rigidities in goods and labor
markets (and subject to constraints on monetary policy), Farhi and Werning (2016) identify
an aggregate demand externality: Ex post, the distribution of wealth across agents affects
aggregate demand and output; but ex ante, these effects are not internalized in private fi-
nancial decisions by atomistic agents.9 Our paper also has externality since each atomistic
investor does not internalize the negative impact of his risky investment on others (through
increasing the probability of crisis). One difference between our paper and these papers
is that we have learning in our model, and focus on the interaction between learning and
externality.10
Finally, the paper is related to the broader literature on macroprudential policies.11 Besides
9 Farhi and Werning (2016) also propose an extended framework to incorporate both pecuniary externality
and aggregate demand externality, and characterize the optimal macroprudential policy that can correct
for these externalities.
10We follow this literature in viewing excessive risk-taking as the result of a financial market externality.
Other mechanisms that can generate excessive risk-taking include neglected disaster risk (Gennaioli et al.,
2012; 2013; Baron and Xiong, 2016), extrapolative expectations (Barberis et al., 2015; and Barberis et al.,
Forthcoming), diagnostic expectations (Bordalo et al., 2016), “this-time-is-different” thinking (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2009), “race-to-the-bottom” peer pressure (Acharya et al., 2011). The key difference is that
our mechanism does not rely on the behavioral assumptions, and is based on a fully rational model.
11Our paper falls into the macroprudential literature also in the sense that the macroprudential orientation
treats the aggregate risk as an endogenous variable that depends on the collective behavior of all financial
institutions, rather than being exogenously given by the market (Kahou and Lehar, 2017).
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the aforementioned macroprudential literature that addresses the time dimention of the sys-
temic risk (i.e., the dynamics of the macroprudential policies over the boom-bust cycle), our
paper is also related to macroprudential literature that addresses the cross-section dimen-
tion of the systemic risk at any given point of time. Financial institutions manage their
own risks but do not consider their impact on the system as a whole, imposing a negative
externality on other institutions (Acharya et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2010). Systemic risk
can also be understood as a network externality resulting from contagion effects (Acemoglu
et al., 2013). To cope with this externality, policymakers can use either taxation (reducing
the gap between public and private costs of systemic risk) or regulation (imposing direct
restrictions and requirements on financial institutions) (Masciandaro and Passarelli, 2013).
Several studies advocate for a taxation of systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2009; Acharya et al.,
2010; Zlatic et al., 2014). To implement the systemic risk tax, we need to properly quantify
systemic risk. To this end, Segoviano (2006) proposes the CIMDO approach; several studies
propose measures that focus on statistics of losses, accompanied by a potential shortfall dur-
ing periods of synchronized behavior where many institutions are simultaneously distressed
(Acharya et al., 2009; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; Brownlees and Engle, 2012; Huang
et al. 2012).12
II Benchmark Model
A Decentralized Problem
A.1 Set up and Learning
There are a continuum of investors, each indexed by i ∈ [0, I] and endowed with 1 unit of
investment good. Each investor can invest in two types of assets: a safe asset in the real
sector, and a risky asset in the financial sector. We can also view both of these two assets as
financial assets: one is a “safe”, conventional financial asset; the other is a risky, innovative
financial asset. The second view allows us to apply our model to study financial innovation.
Time t is discrete and infinite, i.e., t = 1, 2, 3, ... At the beginning of period t, agent i invests
αit ∈ [0, 1] in the risky asset and 1 − αit in the safe asset. At the end of period t, agent i
consumes and dies/exits.
A systemic financial crisis can occur at any point of time. If the financial crisis does not
occur, the safe (real) asset pays µS with probability 1, and the risky (financial) asset pays
µR in expectation, with µR > µS > 0. Figure 2 illustrates the payoff structure of the model.
If the financial crisis does occur, the safe asset pays τSµS with probability 1, and the risky
asset pays τRµR with probability 1 where 0 ≤ τR ≤ τS ≤ 1. Note that τS and τR capture
the post-crisis recovery value of the safe asset and the risky asset, respectively. Moreover,
τS captures the spillover effect from the financial sector to the real sector: if τS = 1, then
even if the financial crisis hits, the payoff of the real asset is still unaffected, and thus there
12For a comprehensive literature review on systemic risk tax, see Poledna and Thurner (2016).
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is no spillover from the financial sector to the real sector; if τS = τR, then the spillover is at
the highest possible level.
The financial sector can be either strong (in state “G”) or fragile (in state “B”). Importantly,
the probability of the financial crisis depends on which state the financial sector is in, as
well as the aggregage position in the risky asset αt ≡
´
αitdi. Denote the crisis probability
at time t in state j ∈ {G, B} by pj(αt). We make the following assumptions about the p(.)
functions:
pj(αt) ∈ [0, 1], ∀αt, ∀j
pG(αt) < pB(αt)
p
′
j(αt) > 0, ∀α, ∀j
Let pit ∈ [0, 1] be the probability at which the period t investors believe the financial sector
is strong. At the beginning of period t, all investors “inherit” the belief pit−1 in the previous
period (i.e., pit−1 is the prior belief), and then update the belief based on the outcomes they
observe from period t− 1. That is,
pit ≡ P (j = G|Ct−1)
where
Ct−1 =
1, if crisis occurred at t− 10, otherwise
For any risky investment αt−1, the probability that the crisis occurs (i.e., Ct−1 = 1) is higher
if the true state is B. That is, pB(αt−1) > pG(αt−1). Thus, if a crisis occurs in t − 1, the
agents will update their beliefs downwards; if not, they will update their beliefs upwards.
Bayesian rule implies that the probability of being a strong sector conditional on no crisis
at t− 1 equals:
pit(Ct−1 = 0) =
P (j = G)P (Ct−1 = 0|j = G)
P (Ct−1 = 0)
= pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)]
pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)] + (1− pit−1)[1− pB(αt−1)]
>
pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)]
pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)] + (1− pit−1)[1− pG(αt−1)]
= pit−1,
where the inequality uses pB(αt−1) > pG(αt−1).
And the probability of being a strong sector conditional on crisis at t− 1 equals:
pit(Ct−1 = 1) =
pit−1pG(αt−1)
pit−1pG(αt−1) + (1− pit−1)pB(αt−1)
<
pit−1pG(αt−1)
pit−1pG(αt−1) + (1− pit−1)pG(αt−1)
= pit−1
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Thus, agents’ confidence grows as they see a longer history of financial tranquility (i.e., no
crisis). These arguments establish the following proposition, which is the key driving force
to the main results explained later.
PROPOSITION 1: A longer history of tranquility (i.e., no crisis) in the financial sector
tends to build up investors’ confidence that the sector is strong. That is, pit strictly increases
in the number of no-crisis periods.
A.2 Characterization of the Competitive Equilibrium
The problem of investor i at period t is:
max
αit[0,1]
pit{(1− pG)[(1− αit)µS + αitµR] +
pG[(1− αit)τsµS + αitτRµR]} +
(1− pit){(1− pB)[(1− αit)µS + αitµR] +
pB[(1− αit)τsµS + αitτRµR]}
For convenience, let ∆0 ≡ µR − µS be the risky asset’s (expected) excess payoff conditional
on no-crisis at t−1, and ∆1 ≡ τRµR− τSµS be its excess payoff conditional on crisis at t−1.
In order for the risky asset to be meaningful, it is natural to assume ∆0 > 0. In addition,
we make the following assumption:
A1: ∆1 < 0, i.e., τRµR < τSµS.
Moreover, let
θt ≡ θ(pit, αt) ≡ pitpG(αt) + (1− pit)pB(αt)
be the unconditional probability of a crisis at period t, which also captures the vulnerability
of the system perceived by investors (or the constrained social planner, as discussed later).
Using these notations, the problem of investor i at period t can be rewritten as:
max
αit[0,1]
[1− θ(pit, αt)](µS + αit∆0) + θ(pit, αt)(τSµS + αit∆1) (1)
The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to αit is given by:
[1− θ(pit, αt)]∆0 + θ(pit, αt)∆1 = 0 (2)
Note that although the individual αit does not show up explicitly in the FOC, it shows up
implicitly through the aggregate αt in θ(αt, pit) ≡ pitpG(αt) + (1−pit)pB(αt). The intuition of
the above FOC (equation (2)) is as follows: in any interior equilibrium, the aggregate risky
asset position αt must be such that the expected excess payoff of the risky asset (relative to
the safe asset) is 0, where the expectation is taken over the occurrence of the crisis. This
is actually the no-arbitrage condition between the risky and safe assets. Although each
individual investor is indifferent between any αit ∈ [0, 1], the aggregate αt must satisfy the
no-arbitrage condition (2). Rewrite equation (2) as:
∆0
∆0 −∆1 − θ(pit, αt) = 0 (3)
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For a given value of pit, it is easy to see that an interior equilibrium exists as long as the
function θ(pit, αt) crosses the value ∆0∆0−∆1 as αt varies. Since θt ≡ pitpG(αt) + (1− pit)pB(αt),
this amounts to a condition on the functions pG and pB. Since we have already assumed that
pB(α) > pG(α)∀α and that both pB and pG are strictly increasing and differentiable (and
hence continuous), a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique interior equilibrium
conditional on any pit is that pB(0) < ∆0∆0−∆1 and pG(1) >
∆0
∆0−∆1 . If these conditions are
not satisfied, agents could learn their way to a corner solution. We do not examine this
possibility in this paper.
The FOC implies that in any (interior) competitive equilibrium, investors will adjust the
risky asset position αt such that θt is always a constant regardless of the belief pit. Moreover,
since θt ≡ pitpG(αt) + (1 − pit)pB(αt), pG(αt) < pB(αt), p′G(αt) > 0, and p′B(αt) > 0, this
implies that as pit increases (which puts a higher weight to pG(αt)), investors will need to
increase αt and thus pB(αt) in order to keep θt constant. Hence, αt strictly increases in pit
under a competitive equilibrium. More formally, we have the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2: The aggregate risky investment αt in the competitive equilibrium strictly
increases in investors’ confidence pit, provided p
′
G(α) > 0 and p
′
B(α) > 0.
PROOF: Rewrite the FOC (3) as
F (αt, pit) = 0
It follows that13
Fα(pit, αt) = −θα(pit, αt) = −[pitp′G(αt) + (1− pit)p
′
B(αt)]
Fpi(pit, αt) = −θpi(pit, αt) = pB(αt)− pG(αt) > 0
Then by implicit function theorem, we have:
dαt
dpit
= −Fpi(pit, αt)
Fα(pit, αt)
= −θpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt)
(4)
Since pB > pG, we have dαtdpit > 0 provided p
′
G(α) > 0 and p
′
B(α) > 0. Q.E.D.
Note that only the first-order derivatives of pG(.) and pB(.) are involved for this proposition
to hold.
Based on Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we can make the following analogue to the set-up in
our model. The decision on αt is like deciding the speed of a car. As each driver becomes
more optimistic that the cliff is far away from his current location (higher pit), he will drive
faster. The higher speed has raised the actual systemic risk that the car will fall off the cliff
(higher pG(αt), pB(αt)), but it is still the optimal behavior of each individual driver because
the probability of falling off the cliff (θt) perceived by him remains constant.
13Following the standard notations in calculas, Fx(x, y) denotes the partial derivative of F (x, y) with respect
to x, treating y constant. Similar comments apply to Fy(x, y), Fxy(x, y), Fxx(x, y), etc.
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B Constrained Planner’s Problem
In this subsection, we consider the problem of a social planner who is subject to the same
constraint as the decentralized investors. That is, the planner cannot observe the true state
of the financial sector either, and also has to update its belief through the realized occurrence
of financial crises.
Since each investor only lives for one period, it is sufficient to consider the planner’s problem
in one single period. Without loss of generosity, the problem of the constrained planner at
period t is:
max
αit[0,1], ∀i
pit{(1− pG)
´
i
[(1− αit)µS + αitµR]di +
pG
´
i
[(1− αit)τsµS + αitτRµR]di} +
(1− pit){(1− pB)
´
i
[(1− αit)µS + αitµR]di +
pB
´
i
[(1− αit)τsµS + αitτRµR]di}
That is,
max
αt[0,1]
pit{(1− pG)[(1− αt)µS + αtµR] +
pG[(1− αt)τsµS + αtτRµR]} +
(1− pit){(1− pB)[(1− αt)µS + αtµR] +
pB[(1− αt)τsµS + αtτRµR]}
Using the same definitions for θ, ∆0, and ∆1, we can rewrite the problem as
max
αt[0,1]
[1− θ(pit, αt)](µS + αt∆0) + θ(pit, αt)(τSµS + αt∆1) (5)
The FOC of the planner is as follows:
[1− θ(pit, αt)]∆0 + θ(pit, αt)∆1 − θα(pit, αt)[(µS + αt∆0)− (τSµS + αt∆1)] = 0 (6)
Comparision between equation (2) and equation (6) makes it clear that the difference between
the decentralized problem (1) and the constrained planner’s problem (5) is that the planner
takes into account the impact of the risky asset position on the conditional crisis probabilities
pG(αt) and pG(αt) (equivalently, on the unconditional crisis probability or the perceived
vulnerability θt). Specifically, a higher risky position αt raises the crisis probability θt and
lowers the excess payoff of the risky asset as well as the welfare of the investors. This
is the negative externality which individual investors fail to consider in the decentralized
equilibrium. Specifically, the externality term consists of two elements: the first is the
probability term θα(pit, αt), which is the increase in crisis probability due to the increase in
α; the second is the payoff term (µS +αt∆0)− (τSµS +αt∆1), which is the reduction in total
payoff in case the crisis does occur.
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Normalize (6) by dividing by ∆0 −∆1:
∆0
∆0 −∆1 − θ(pit, αt)− ξ(αt, pit) = 0 (7)
where ξ(pit, αt) captures the normalized externality of the system, defined as
ξ(pit, αt) ≡ θα(pit, αt)[αt + (1− τS)µS∆0 −∆1 ] ≡ θα(pit, αt)
1
X
Comparision between the normalized FOC of the competitive equilibrium with that of the
planner (equation (3) versus equation (7)) makes it clear that while the market adjusts
αt to keep θ(pit, αt) constant in equilibrium, the constrained planner adjusts αt to keep
θ(pit, αt) + ξ(pit, αt) constant.
The following proposition characterizes the constrained planner’s equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 3: The aggregate risky investment αt in the constrained planner’s equi-
librium strictly increases in the planner’s confidence pit, provided p
′
B(α) > p
′
G(α) > 0,
p
′′
B(α) > 0, and p
′′
G(α) > 0.
PROOF: Rewrite the planner’s FOC (7) as
Φ(pit, αt) = 0
It follows that
Φα(pit, αt) = −θα(pit, αt)− ξα(pit, αt)
Φpi(pit, αt) = −θpi(pit, αt)− ξpi(pit, αt)
where ξα(pit, αt) = θαα(pit, αt) 1X + θα(pit, αt) > 0, and ξpi(pit, αt) = θαpi(pit, αt)
1
X
.
By implicit function theorem, we have
dαt
dpit
= −Φpi(pit, αt)Φα(pit, αt) =
−θpi(pit, αt)− ξpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt) + ξα(pit, αt)
(8)
for the constrained planner’s equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2 indicates that θpi(pit, αt) < 0 and θα(pit, αt) > 0, provided p
′
G(α) >
0 and p′B(α) > 0. Note that
ξpi(pit, αt) = θαpi(pit, αt)
1
X
= [p′G(αt)− p
′
B(αt)]
1
X
< 0
provided p′B(αt) > p
′
G(αt); and
θαα(pit, αt) = pitp
′′
G(αt) + (1− pit)p
′′
B(αt) > 0
provided p′′G(αt) > 0 and p
′′
B(αt) > 0. Therefore, dαtdpit > 0 provided p
′
B(α) > p
′
G(α) > 0,
p
′′
B(α) > 0, and p
′′
G(α) > 0. Q.E.D.
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C Comparison between the Decentralized and Planner’s
Equilibria
C.1 Constrained Inefficiency of the Competitive Equilibrium
To distinguish between the two equilibria, hereafter we denote the competitive equilibrium
and the constrained planner’s equilibrium by αCt and αPt , respectively. The following propo-
sition compares the levels of these two equilibria:
PROPOSITION 4: The competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient, and is character-
ized by excessive risk taking. That is, αCt (pit) > αPt (pit) for any level of belief pit.
PROOF: Recall that the competitive equilibrium and the constrained planner’s equilibrium
are given respectively by
F (pit, αCt ) = 0
Φ(pit, αSt ) = F (pit, αSt )− ξ(pit, αSt ) = 0
where ξ(pit, αSt ) > 0 by the proof of Proposition 3.
It follows that
F (pit, αSt ) = ξ(pit, αSt ) > 0 = F (pit, αCt )
Since F (pit, αt) is strictly decreasing in αt for any pit, we have αSt < αCt for any pit. Q.E.D.
C.2 Interaction between Learning and Inefficiency
Although the negative externality discussed above exists even in a model without learning,
this subsection will examine the interaction between the negative externality and learning,
and will establish that learning can aggravate the negative externality problem as long as
the perceived vulnerability function θ(pit, αt) satisfies some conditions.
To this end, we will first define the “sufficiently convex condition”:
Sufficiently convex condition (SCC): θ(pit, αt) is sufficiently convex in αt for any pit, if and
only if θαα(pit, αt) > θα(pit,αt)|θpi(pit,αt)| |θαpi(pit, αt)| − θαX.
For the convenience of illustration, we make two more definitions:
Iso-vulnerability curve (IV): a locus of (pi, α) along which the perceived vulnerability θ(pi, α)
is constant, i.e., pipG(α) + (1− pi)pB(α) = θ¯ for some constant θ¯ ∈ [0, 1].
Iso-externality curve (IE): a locus of (pi, α) along which the normalized externality ξ(pi, α) is
constant, i.e., θα(pit, αt) 1X (αt) = ξ¯ for some constant ξ¯ > 0.
Based on these definitions, we have the following lemma:
LEMMA 1: The SCC is satisfied if and only if the slope of the iso-vulnerability curve is
larger than that of the iso-externality curve.
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PROOF: Take the total derivative of the IV equation with respect to pi:
θpi + θα
dα
dpi
= 0
So the slope of IV equals
dα
dpi
|IV = −θpi
θα
Notice that −θpi = pB(α) − pG(α) > 0 and θα = pip′G(α) + (1 − pi)p′B(α) > 0, so dαdpi |IV > 0,
i.e., the IV curve slopes upward.
Similarly, the slope of IE equals
dα
dpi
|IE = −ξpi
ξα
=
−θαpi 1X
θαα
1
X
+ θα
= −θαpi
θαα + θαX
Also, −θαpi = p′B(α)− p′G(α) > 0, θαα = pip′′G(α) + (1− pi)p′′B(α) > 0, θα > 0, and X > 0, so
dα
dpi
|IE > 0, i.e., the IE curve slopes upward as well.
Then we have
dα
dpi
|IV = −θpi
θα
>
−θαpi
θαα + θαX
= dα
dpi
|IE
if and only if
θαα >
θα
|θpi| |θαpi| − θαX,
which is the SCC. Q.E.D.
Figure 3 illustrates an example of IV and IE curves that satisfy the SCC. Based on this
lemma, we can establish the following proposition, which compares the responses of α (with
respect to pit) by the competitive equilibrium and the constrained planner’s equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 5: As investors become more optimistic after observing a longer history of
financial tranquility, the investment in the competitive equilibrium αCt increases faster than
that in the constrained efficient equilibrium αPt , if and only if the SCC is satisfied. In other
words, when the SCC is satisfied, the learning process strengthens the negative externality,
and aggravates the excessive risk-taking problem and the inefficiency.
PROOF: Recall equations (4) and (8):
dαCt
dpit
= −θpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt)
dαPt
dpit
= −θpi(pit, αt)− ξpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt) + ξα(pit, αt)
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Therefore, dα
C
t
dpit
>
dαPt
dpit
if and only if
−θpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt)
>
−θpi(pit, αt)− ξpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt) + ξα(pit, αt)
Equivalently,
−θpi(pit, αt)
θα(pit, αt)
>
−ξpi(pit, αt)
ξα(pit, αt)
(9)
By Lemma 1, condition (9) is exactly the same as the necessary and sufficient condition for
the function θ(pit, αt) to be “sufficiently convex” in αt. Q.E.D.
The intuition of the proposition can be understood as a two-round problem. In Round
One, as the market and the constrained planner become more confident (pi increases by
∆pi), two effects will occur: first, both the market and the constrained planner will assign
a higher weight to pG while computing the unconditional crisis probability (i.e., perceived
vulnerability) θ, and thus both will perceive a lower θ, which induces both the market and
the planner to increase their aggregate risky investment αC and αP ; second, the planner will
assign a higher weight to p′G(αt) while computing θα (i.e., the planner believes the system
becomes more resilient), and thus the externality ξ ≡ θα 1X will decrease by |ξpi|∆pi, which
induces the planner to further increase αP relative to αC by |αPξ ||ξpi|∆pi (“resilience effect”,
RE). Note that the parameter |ξpi| (i.e.,|∂θα∂pi |) is crucial for determining the magnitude of the
RE. This effect appears counter-intuitive, but is – in our view – reasonable, and it is a new
channel identified by our paper. Also note that the market will ignore the second effect (the
externality) associated with the increase in pi.
Then in Round Two, as the aggregate risky investment α increases, the planner will want to
decrease α to account for the externality. Specifically, the higher α will raise the uncondi-
tional crisis probability (i.e., perceived vulnerability) θ, which in turn raises the externality
ξ by ξα∆α. The higher externality will induce the planner to decrease αP relative to αC
by |αPξ |ξα∆α (“risk-taking effect”, RTE). This second effect is the traditional externality
argument. Again, the market will ignore this second effect associated with the increase in α.
Therefore, the ultimate comparision between ∆αP and ∆αC depends on the comparison
between the relative increase in αP in Round One due to the RE and the relative decrease
in αP in Round Two due to the RTE. The SCC exactly captures this comparision: if θ is
sufficiently convex in α, then the subsequent decrease in αP due to the RTE will dominate
the initial increase in αP due to the RE, and thus αP will increase less than αC . Figure 4
illustrates this tradeoff. We can also see this mathematically: On the one hand, the RTE
dominates the RE if and only if |αPξ |ξα∆α > |αPξ ||ξpi|∆pi, that is, ∆α∆pi > |ξpi |ξα (slope of the IE
curve). On the other hand, all competitive equilibria correspond to the same θ (and thus
any adjustment to α and pi must be on the same IV curve), so ∆α∆pi is actually the slope of
the IV curve. Therefore, RTE dominates RE if and only if the SCC holds.
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III Competitive Equilibrim with Tax
In this section, we will show the existence of the optimal capital income tax which can
restore the constrained efficiency of the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we will derive
an analytical solution for the optimal tax as a function of the belief, and discuss its properties
from a macroprudential policy perspective.
A Decentralized Equilibrium with Tax
Specifically, the capital income tax scheme works as follows: for every dollar of the payoff
from the risky asset at period t, the investor will pay Dt dollar. Under such a tax scheme,
the decentralized problem of investor i at period t is:
max
αit[0,1]
pit{(1− pG)[(1− αit)µS + αitµR(1−Dt)] +
pG[(1− αit)τSµS + αitτRµR(1−Dt)]} +
(1− pit){(1− pB)[(1− αit)µS + αitµR(1−Dt)] +
pB[(1− αit)τSµS + αitτRµR(1−Dt)]}
Using the previous notations for the two constants ∆0 ≡ µR − µS and ∆1 ≡ τRµR − τSµS,
we can rewrite the above problem of investor i at period t as:
max
αit[0,1]
(1− θt)[µS + αit(∆0 − µRDt)] + θt[τSµS + αit(∆1 − τRµRDt)] (10)
The FOC of the above problem is (taking pG and pB as given):
∆0 − µRDt + [(∆1 − τRµRDt)− (∆0 − µRDt)]θt = 0 (11)
B Optimal Tax and Macroprudential Policy Implications
Now we derive the analytical solution of the optimal tax rate. For this purpose, denote
the social planner’s risky position as αP . Corresponding to this αP , there is an associated
θP ≡ pitpG(αP )+(1−pit)pB(αP ) ∈ (0, 1). This θP is the level of θ prevailing in the constrained
efficient equilibrium. It is also the target level of θ that the competitive equilibrium needs
to achieve (by adjusting the tax Dt) in order to be constrained efficient.
Plug the target level of θ (i.e., θP ) into the competitive equilibrium’s FOC, and we get the
unique optimal tax rate:
D∗ = ∆0 + (∆1 −∆0)θ
P
µR + (τRµR − µR)θP (12)
Using ∆0 = µR − µS and ∆1 = τRµR − τSµS and after some rearrangements, we have
D∗ = 1− µS[1− (1− τS)θ
P ]
µR[1− (1− τR)θP ] (13)
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The proposition below formally presents the existence of a well-defined optimal tax rate:
PROPOSITION 6: For any level of belief pit, there exists a unique optimal tax rate D∗ ∈
(0, 1) given by equation (13) which can restore the constrained efficiency of the competitive
equilibrium.
PROOF: Since 0 < (1 − τS)θP < 1, 0 < (1 − τR)θP < 1, µS > 0, and µR > 0, we have
D∗ < 1.
Now suppose D∗ ≤ 0, that is, µS[1− (1− τS)θP ] ≥ µR[1− (1− τR)θP ]. Using µR − µS = ∆0
and τRµR − τSµS = ∆1, this implies:
−µS(1− τS)θP ≥ −µR(1− τR)θSP + µR − µS
∆0 + (∆1 −∆0)θP ≤ 0 (14)
However, the planner’s FOC (6) implies that
∆0 + (∆1 −∆0)θP = θα(αt, pit)[αt(∆0 −∆1) + (1− τs)y] > 0
where the last inequality used θα(αt, pit) = pitp
′
G(α) + (1 − pit)p′B(α) > 0. This contradicts
inequality (14). Therefore, we have D∗ > 0 for any pit. Q.E.D.
Moreover, the optimal tax D∗ has an important relationship with the belief pit, which is
summarized in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 7: As investors and the constrained planner become more confident (i.e.,
as pit increases) , the optimal tax rate D∗t needed to restore the constrained efficiency will be
higher, if and only if the SCC is satisfied.
PROOF: The analytical solution of D∗, equation (13), implies that
dD∗
dpi
= −−µS(1− τS)
dθP
dpi
µR[1− (1− τR)θP ] + µS[1− (1− τS)θP ]µR(1− τR)dθPdpi
{µR[1− (1− τR)θP ]}2
= µSµR
dθP
dpi
[1− (1− τR)θP ](1− τS)− [1− (1− τS)θP ](1− τR)
{µR[1− (1− τR)θP ]}2
= µSµR
dθP
dpi
τR − τS
{µR[1− (1− τR)θP ]}2
Since µSµR > 0, we have
Sign(dD
∗
dpi
) = Sign[dθ
P
dpi
(τR − τS)]
Assumption ∆1 < 0 implies that τR < τS µSµR < τS (using 0 < µS < µR), so τR − τS < 0.
Hence, dD∗
dpi
> 0 if and only if dθP
dpi
< 0.
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Recall that θt ≡ pitpG(αt) + (1− pit)pB(αt), we have
dθP
dpi
= θpi(αt, pit) + θα(αt, pit)
dαP
dpi
(15)
The first term of equation (15), θpi(αt, pit) = pG(αP )− pB(αP ), is negative and captures the
direct effect of pi on θP : as investors and the constrained planner become more optimistic
that the financial industry is strong (in which case the crisis would be less likely to occur),
the unconditional crisis probability θP perceived by them tends to be lower. The second
term θα(αt, pit)dα
P
dpi
is positive and captures the indirect effect of pi on θP : a more optimistic
belief also induces investors and the constrained planner to increase their positions in the
risky asset (α becomes higher), which in turn raises the unconditional crisis probability θ.
Rearrange equation (15) and we get:
dθP
dpi
= θα(αt, pit)[
θpi(αt, pit)
θα(αt, pit)
+ dα
P
dpi
]
= θα(αt, pit)(
dαP
dpi
− dα
C
dpi
)
Since θα(αt, pit) > 0, we have dθ
P
dpi
< 0 if and only if dαC
dpi
> dα
P
dpi
, that is, the SCC is satisfied
(by Proposition 5). Q.E.D.
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 6, we have the following important macropruden-
tial policy implication: as the market tranquility lasts for one more period, the policy maker
should raise the capital income tax in order to curb the excessive risk taking and lower the
systemic risk.
The qualification of this proposition (the perceived vulnerability function θ(αt, pit) needs to
be sufficiently convex in αt) also has an important policy implication. For this purpose,
let us interpret the constrained planner as the financial regulator. When the regulator
becomes more confident that the financial sector is strong, it will assign a higher weight to
pG(αt) (while computing θ(αt, pit)) as well as to p
′
G(αt) (while computing θα(αt, pit)). That
is, as the regulator becomes more optimistic (pit becoming higher), it will believe that not
only the crisis would occur with a lower probability (corresponding to a lower level of the
perceived vulnerability θ(αt, pit)), but also the financial system will be more resillient to
any additional build-up in the aggregate position of the risky investment (corresponding
to a lower marginal derivarive of the perceived vulnerability θ(αt, pit) with respect to αt).
As a result, the higher confidence tends to induce the regulator to initially increase the
aggregate risky position αP more than the increase of αC by the market (“resilience effect”).
However, there is a countervailing effect: as αP increases, the regulator understands that
the externality will increase, which would induce the regulator to subsequently decrease αP
more than the decrease of αC by the market (“risk-taking effect”). If the resilience effect
dominates the risk-taking effect, the ultimate increase in αP will be higher than that in αC ,
and the regulator will decrease the optimal tax to achieve this; otherwise, the regulator will
increase the optimal tax.
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IV Inefficient Deregulation/Regulation and Further
Comparative Statics
The qualification of Proposition 7 raises an interesting question: what if the financial regu-
lator mistakenly believes that the SCC fails? This subsection examines this question using
a simple extension of the previous model.
Specifically, introduce a “regulator” to the previous model, who has the following features:
first, like the constrained planner, it has to learn about the true state of the financial sector
and it cares about the welfare of all investors; second, unlike the constrained planner, it
mechanically14 over-estimates |ξpi| such that |θpi(pit,αt)|θα(pit,αt) ≤
|ξpi(pit,αt)|
ξα(pit,αt) for some pit and some αt
(i.e., it believes that the SCC fails), even though the SCC actually holds. Moreover, it
makes the decision based on the over-estimated |ξpi|. This second assumption caputures the
possibility that some regulators in reality tend to over-estimate the resilience of the financial
system.
Consider an initial situation where the belief is pi and the optimal capital income tax needed
to restore constrained efficiency is D∗. As pi increases to pi + ∆pi, Proposition 7 implies that
the capital income tax chosen by this regulator will decrease to DReg(pi + ∆pi) = D∗ −∆D.
However, because the SCC actually holds, Proposition 7 also implies that the actual optimal
capital income tax that would be chosen by the constrained planner, denoted by DP (pi+∆pi),
is larger than D∗. Hence,
DReg(pi + ∆pi) < D∗ < DP (pi + ∆pi)
And thus
αReg(pi + ∆pi) > αP (pi + ∆pi)
More formally, we have the following corollary to Proposition 7 and Proposition 1:
COROLLARY 1: In case the regulator over-estimates the resilience of the financial system
and mistakenly believes the SCC fails ( |θpi |
θα
≤ |ξpi |
ξα
): as the regulator observes one more no-
crisis period and becomes more confident, it will lower the capital income tax and induce an
inefficiently high aggregate risky investment position.
This simple corollary has an important policy implication. Recently, the U.S. Administration
has lauched serious discussions on rolling back some of Obama-era financial regulations.
Although our paper does not explicitly assess the plausibility of such initiatives, it does raise
the possibility that such initiatives may be a result of an over-optimistic view of the financial
system’s resilience (combined with the fact that the U.S. financial system has been relatively
tranquil in the last few years). The August 2017 Jackson Hole meeting was also dominated
by the discussions on financial deregulations.
14“Mechanically” means that the regulator does not learn about |ξpi|, but instead makes a mechanical and
persistent judgement about it.
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The flip side is inefficient regulation. In case the regulator under-estimates the resilience of
an innovative financial sector and mistakenly believes the SCC holds ( |θpi |
θα
> |ξpi |
ξα
): as the
regulator observes one more no-crisis period and understands that the market becomes more
confident, it will tighten the regulation and induce an inefficiently low aggregate investment
in this industry. As mentioned in the introduction, China is experiencing a rapidly-booming
period for the online finance industry. Should the government loosen the regulation to
further support its development, or tighten the regulation to contain the future risk? Our
model provides a framework for thinking about this pressing question, and highlights the
importance of quantifying the trade-off between the resilience effect and risk-taking effect to
avoid repressing socially valuable financial innovations.
COROLLARY 2: If the crisis damages the safe real sector more (lower τS) and/or the risky
financial sector less (higher τR), then:
(i) the market will invest more in the risky sector.
(ii) the planner will be more likely to raise the tax when the market has been tranquil for a
longer time.
The intuition of the corollary is as follows: a lower τS and/or higher τR imply that the safe
sector is less attractive than the risky one. This induces investors to invest more in the risky
sector, hence Part (i) of the corollary. Moreover, given the stronger incentive of the market
to invest in the risky sector, αC is more responsive to the confidence pi under a lower τS
and/or higher τR; to contain the higher externality, the planner would be more likely to raise
the tax as the financial tranquility persists for one more period (and the confidence builds
up further).
V Examples
Consider the following parametric specification:
pG(α) =aG + bG · αk and
pB(α) =aB + bB · αk.
We will assume the followings: (1) aB ≥ aG ≥ 0, bB ≥ bG > 0; (2) ai + bi ≤ 1 for any
i = B,G and (3) k ≥ 1. The first two assumptions guarantee that the probability of crisis
in either state pG, pB ∈ [0, 1] and are increasing in the aggregate risky investment α. The
third assumption implies that the probability of crisis in either state is convex in α.
Thus,
θ = (piaG + (1− pi)aB) + (pibG + (1− pi)bB)αk.
This implies
−θpi = (aB − aG) + αk(bB − bG), θα = kαk−1(pibG + (1− pi)bB),
−θpiα = kαk−1(bB − bG), θαα = k(k − 1)αk−2(pibG + (1− pi)bB).
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Recall that the slope of IV is
−θpi
θα
= α(bB − bG) + (aB − aG)α
1−k
k(pibG + (1− pi)bB) .
On the other hand,
ξ(pit, αt) = θα(pit, αt)
1
X
= θα(pit, αt)[αt +
(1− τS)µS
∆0 −∆1 ]
and slope of IE is
−ξpi
ξα
= −θpiα
θαα + θαX
= α(bB − bG)((k − 1) + αX)(pibG + (1− pi)bB) .
Therefore, condition SCC holds true - i.e., the slope of IV is greater than the slope of IE iff
α(bB − bG) + (aB − aG)α1−k
k(pibG + (1− pi)bB) >
α(bB − bG)
((k − 1) + αX)(pibG + (1− pi)bB) ,
α(bB − bG)(k − (1− αX)) + (aB − aG)α1−k(k − (1− αX)) >α(bB − bG)k
(aB − aG)α−k(k − (1− αX)) >(bB − bG)(1− αX)
k >
(
1 + bB − bG
aB − aGα
k
)
(1− αX).
Assuming strict inequalities aB > aG and bB > bG, we can say that under this parametric
specification, if k > 1 + bB−bG
aB−aG , then condition SCC holds, but otherwise condition SCC may
not hold.
Suppose that a marginal increase in aggregate risky investment α increases the probability of
crisis exactly the same regardless of the states being G or B - i.e., p′G = p′B. In this parametric
example, this is equivalent to bB = bG. Note that the RHS of the above inequality becomes
1 − αX < 1. Thus, condition SCC hold for any k > 1 (however small). Therefore, the
planner should optimally increase the tax when the market has been tranquil for a longer
time.
Let us consider another extreme case. Suppose that at zero aggregate risky investment, the
probability of crisis is the same regardless of the state - i.e., aB = aG. Then the RHS of the
above inequality becomes ∞. Thus, condition SCC does not hold regardless of k (however
large). Therefore, the planner should optimally decrease the tax when the market has been
tranquil for a longer time.
VI Dynamics of Learning and Markov Switching
This section further examines the dynamics of learning under the assumption of a fixed true
state, as well as extends our model to the case where the true state follows a Markov process.
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A Dynamics of Learning
Proposition 1 has the following corollary:
COROLLARY 3: The dynamics of investors’ learning process have two properties:
First, investors will not revise down their confidence until the crisis has actually hit.
Second, the occurrence of crisis only affects investors’ confidence in the immediately next
period alone, and the confidence will again improve from the second post-crisis period on as
long as there is no crisis in the previous period.
PROOF: The first property directly follows the proof of Proposition 1. Below is the proof
of the second property.
Suppose the first crisis occurs in Period tC1 . Proposition 1 implies that at the beginning of
the immediately next period t = tC1 + 1, investors’ posterior belief pitC1 +1 < pitC1 .
At the beginning of any tC1 + 2 ≤ t ≤ tC2 , where tC2 is the period during which the second
crisis occurs, investors’ posterior belief is:
pit = P (j = G|Ct−1 = 0)
= pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)]
pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)] + (1− pit−1)[1− pB(αt−1)]
>
pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)]
pit−1[1− pG(αt−1)] + (1− pit−1)[1− pG(αt−1)]
= pit−1.
That is, the first crisis only lowers the confidence at the immediately next period; after then,
the confidence will still increase in the number of tranquil periods. The above proof applies
to all crises. Q.E.D.
In some sense, the two properties in this corollary suggest that investors are subject to a
“complacency trap:” They will lower the confidence only after they actually go through a
crisis, and they will (rationally) become “complacent” again two periods after the crisis.
The top-left panel of Figure 5 (Figure 6) plots the dynamics of the investors’ posterior belief
when the financial sector’s true state is fragile (strong), under some parametrizations of the
pG(.) and pB(.) functions. In these figures, one sharp decline corresponds to the occurrence
of one crisis. Note that even though the posterior belief converges to 0 when the true state
is fragile, the peak of the learning cycle does not decrease over time as the system is hit by
more and more crises: investors can still be more confident at the peak of a subsequent cycle
than they were at the peak of a previous cycle. This further confirms the “complacency
trap.”
B Markov Switching
If the underlying state is underlying state is fixed, then the agents will eventually learn the
underlying state, as the simulation shows (Figures 5 and 6). Note that under the social
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planner solution, the crisis occurs less frequently regardless of the state, due to the fact that
the planner will contain the excessive risk-taking ex ante.
If the underlying state is not fixed, i.e., a good state may become bad or a bad state may
become good, then agents may never learn the true state. Our model can be extend to such
a setting. For example, consider a Markov transition, where the underlying state remains
the same with probability q ∈ (12 , 1) and switches with probability 1 − q.15 While updating
their beliefs that the state is G, agents will consider both possibilities that (1) the state j
was G and it remains G, and (2) the state j was B but it has become G. Let pit be the
interim updated belief that jt−1 = G and pi
′
t be the final updated belief that jt = G.
P (jt = G|Ct−1 = 0) = P (jt = G, jt−1 = G|Ct−1 = 0) + P (jt = G, jt−1 = B|Ct−1 = 0)
= P (jt = G|jt−1 = G)P (jt−1 = G|Ct−1 = 0)
+P (jt = G|jt−1 = B)P (jt−1 = B|Ct−1 = 0).
⇒ pi′t(Ct−1 = 0) = qpit(Ct−1 = 0) + (1− q)[1− pit(Ct−1 = 0)]
= (2q − 1)pit(Ct−1 = 0) + (1− q),
where pit(Ct−1 = 0) is exactly the same as defined before (i.e., in the case where the true
state is fixed). Similarly, we can also define and obtain
P (jt = G|Ct−1 = 1) = pi′t(Ct−1 = 1)
= (2q − 1)pit(Ct−1 = 1) + (1− q).
The simulation in Figure 7 shows the dynamics of belief and risky investment of the decen-
tralized market and those of the social planner.
Importantly, given that q > 12 and thus 2q − 1 > 0, it follows that pi′t(Ct−1 = 0) (under
Markov switching) is monotonically increasing in pit(Ct−1 = 0) (under fixed true states).
Therefore, Proposition 1 still holds under Markov switching, i.e., a longer history of financial
tranquility builds up investors’ confidence that the sector is strong. Consequently, all other
propositions hold under Markov switching. The same arguments apply to pi′t(Ct−1 = 1).
VII Conclusion
Recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of
financial stability and investor optimism. In this paper, we examine how to account for the
cycles of optimism and pessimism in the design of macroprudential policies. Our first contri-
bution is to illustrate the excessive risk-taking in financial markets through the interaction
between the negative externality and learning. A long history of financial tranquility (i.e.,
the absence of the crisis), as observed in the lead-up to the global crisis of 2007-2008, builds
up investors’ confidence and leads them to take larger positions in the risky asset. However,
15The assumption that q > 12 makes more sense than q <
1
2 because the underlying state is likely to display
some persistency.
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a larger aggregate risky asset position raises the probability of the crisis. Moreover, each
trader imposes a negative externality through the effect of his risky asset position on the
systemic crisis probability. As a result, the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by
constained inefficiency and excessive risk-taking.
Our second contribution is to provide a simple framework to assess the efficiency of macro-
prudential regulation. We characterize conditions for the degree of constrained inefficiency
to be increasing in investors’ confidence, which also turn out to be the conditions for the
countercyclicality of optimal macroprudential policies. We evaluate the potential of a macro-
prudential policy in the form of a capital income tax (similar to the tax proposed by Acharya
et al., 2009) to restore constrained efficiency and reduce systemic risk, and find that under
the same conditions the optimal tax rate should be higher as the market tranquility persists.
This result contributes to the literature by highlighting that optimal macroprudential poli-
cies are not always countercyclical; instead, it depends on the tradeoff between the “resilience
effect” and “risk-taking effect.” If the policymaker incorrectly assesses this tradeoff, then it
may engage in an “inefficient regulation.” This result raises the possibility that the ongoing
discussions of financial deregulation in U.S. Administration may be a result of an unjustified
over-optimistic view of the financial system’s resilience (combined with the fact that the U.S.
financial system has been relatively tranquil in the last few years). The inefficiency could
also go in the other direction: a regulator that underestimates the resilience of the financial
system may repress financial activities needlessly. This could prevent the uptake of financial
innovations that might really be effective at delivering value to investors. Our framework
could be used to shed light on these discussions.
There are two avenues for future research. First, it can be directed at providing a micro
foundation for the crisis probability functions (pG(α) and pB(α)). Second, it can be directed
at testing the implications of our model using rigorous empirical methods.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Input Effect and Transmission Effect
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Figure 2: Payoff Structure
31
Figure 3: Iso-Vulnerability and Iso-Externality Curves
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Figure 4: Iso-Vulnerability and Iso-Externality Curves
Note: ∆αC is the ultimate change of the market’s risky position; ∆αP,1 and ∆αP,2 are the
change of the planner’s risky position in the first and the second round, respectively; RE
represents “resilience effect”, and RTE represents “risk-taking effect”.
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Learning and Investments: Bad State
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Figure 6: Dynamics of Learning and Investments: Good State
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Figure 7: Dynamics of Learning and Investments under Markov Switching
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